This is an issue that has attracted some interest in the course of the history of thought. In this paper I will be looking into the views of a contemporary author who sees the relationship of willing to belief as an issue recurring thoughout the history of philosophy.
In his book Religious Belief and
the Will2, Louis Pojman identifies Soren
Kierkegaard as a direct
prescriptive volitionalist, i.e. a thinker who holds that
beliefs can and
ought to be (at least in some circumstances) directly willed.
C. Stephen Evans, in "Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly
Willed?"3 responds to Pojman's position,
arguing that the attribution of
direct
volitionalism to Kierkegaard is too strong a claim. Evans does
admit Kierkegaard
as an indirect volitionalist, i.e. as holding that we
can bring about belief
states indirectly, as consequences of other
actions that are themselves directly
willed. (An example might be my
taking up a winter sport, in order to produce
a belief that winter is an
enjoyable season.)
Additional articles4 have appeared in the
literature recently, which respond
to Pojman's position in Religious Belief and the Will, as well as
views presented
in Pojman's book entitled The Logic of Subjectivity5, and a paper Pojman recently
contributed to the ongoing discussion, viz. "Kierkegaard on Faith and
Freedom."6
Various related issues are dealt with in these discussions, many of which would
make interesting topics for another paper.
In this paper I will be examining Pojman's analysis of Kierkegaard's views, as
articulated in Religious Belief and the Will, and Evans's paper,
as it relates
specifically to arguments contained in Pojman's book. For support of their
varying positions, both authors rely primarily upon references to
Philosophical
Fragments7 and Concluding Unscientific
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments8, by
the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus. These are the Kierkegaardian writings
that I will be referring to as well. The question of the relationship between
the views of Kierkegaard and the views attributed to the pseudonymous author will
not be discussed here. I will refer to the author as Kierkegaard when responding
to a discussion that refers to 'Kierkegaard.' When responding to a discussion
which refers to 'Climacus,' and in my own analysis of the The
Fragments and The
Postscript, I prefer to refer to the author under the pseudonym.
In the first section of my paper, I will describe Pojman's views concerning
Kierkegaard, and I will paraphrase the definitions of volitionalism laid out by
Pojman. I will explicate the proffered grounds for his analysis of Kierkegaard,
and will consider the strength of his position. In the second part of this
paper, I will examine the extent to which Evans successfully replies to Pojman.
The issue of the strength of Evans's own position will be addressed. I will
offer an alternative to Evans's critique.
In my final section I will investigate the relevance of the discussion of
volitionalism to a general reading of the Postscript. Are there grounds for
supposing that Climacus is advocating either direct, or indirect, or prescriptive
volitionalism? Is there reason to suspect that he would oppose these positions?
2. Pojman's view that Kierkegaard is a volitionalist
In Religious Belief and the Will, Pojman offers an overview of how
the relation
of willing to faith and belief varies throughout the history of western thought.
He provides descriptions of various well-known thinkers in order to illustrate
types of volitionalism, and he presents arguments intended to undermine the
validity and coherence of direct and prescriptive volitionalism. I am taking
issue only with Pojman's characterization of Kierkegaard as a direct prescriptive
volitionalist.
Pojman defines volitionalism as the view that believing is an act that is under
our control. Direct volitionalism is the position that one can acquire beliefs
directly, simply by willing to believe certain propositions. Indirect
volitionalism is the view some beliefs arise indirectly, from basic acts of the
will. Pojman identifies an additional set of distinctions. Some volitionalists
are prescriptive, some are only descriptive. The latter is the psychological
position that the "voliting" of beliefs is possible. The former goes a step
further, and asserts a normative element, holding that it is permissible or
obligatory to take the necessary steps to acquire beliefs based on nonepistemic
considerations (Pojman, 143-144).
It appears that it is the position of prescriptive volitionalism that Pojman
finds particularly perplexing. Rejection of the value of this position is a
major impetus behind the writing of his book, as evidenced by certain remarks
made by Pojman in the introduction to Religious Belief and the
Will:
This work arose from two experiences in my life. As a child I found
myself
doubting religious statements, and being told that there was something disloyal
or apostate about such attitudes. I often found it impossible to make leaps of
faith into orthodoxy, as I was supposed to do.
The second experience that led to working out these ideas was studying the work
of Soren Kierkegaard, the Danish Christian Existentialist. Kierkegaard, as the
reader will see, was a consummate volitionalist, apparently believing that every
belief was a product of the will in some way. It was trying to come to grips
with his thought in graduate school that convinced me there was something wrong
with, at least, some types of volitionalism(Pojman, xii).
We can sympathize with Pojman here, as he rebels against the notion that he is
somehow morally in the wrong if he does not produce faith at will. But is this
Kierkegaard's position? Does Kierkegaard maintain that we can and ought to will
belief? Is the "leap of faith" constituted by a decision to believe in God -
despite lack of evidence, or even evidence to the contrary?
Pojman does not make an explicit identification of the "leap of faith" with the
willing of faith. However, this identification does seem to be one that is
implicitly assumed, as evidenced by remarks made in his introduction, quoted
above. Pojman is not alone in this popular interpretation of Kierkegaard's
concept of leap. But in my own reading of the Fragments and
Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, I failed to find a strong indication that
Kierkegaard
intends the expression "leap" to be understood in this sense.
I will review some discussions of "leap" found in the Postscript, in
this paper's
final section, below. The point I want to make here is that Pojman seems to have
a particular axe to grind with Kierkegaard. Pojman is reacting to the
prescriptive direct volitionalism he initially saw in Kierkegaard during his days
as a graduate student.
Pojman offers references to the writings of Kierkegaard as support for the claim
that Kierkegaard is a prescriptive, direct volitionalist.
Pojman points out that, according to Kierkegaard, "Even if we had direct proofs
for theism or Christianity, we would not want them; for they would take the
venture out of the religious experience... For him [Kierkegaard] faith is the
highest virtue precisely because it is objectively uncertain, for personal growth
into selfhood depends on uncertainty, risk..."(Pojman, 71). Pojman's source for these remarks
is the chapter 'The Historical Point of View' in the Postscript.
As I read Pojman, these, and similar references, are intended to show that
Kierkegaard reasoned:
The former of these claims is an accurate description of Kierkegaard's views as
represented in the Postscript. The existence of God, and the
truth of
Christianity, cannot be known with certainty. Furthermore, it is not simply a
matter of adequate evidence not yet having been accumulated. The seeker of
objective evidence for Christianity commits a kind of category mistake, "[a
shifting of one genus to another]"(Postscript, 136).
Proof of God's existence is not to be found
in the objective realm. "An objective acceptance is Paganism or
thoughtlessness."(Postscript, 130). It is paganism,
because it regards God as immanent, or as
within the objective realm. The conviction that God's existence is demonstrable
assumes His immanence, rather than His transcendence beyond the knowable
objective realm.
At issue here is the inference to the second claim. I maintain that Kierkegaard
does not hold the latter view, nor is he obliged to hold it; it does not follow
from the first claim. The fact that a belief does not result from objective
evidence, does not imply that that belief results from simply willing it into
existence. Alternative explanations are possible.
Pojman interprets Kierkegaard as not only a direct, but a prescriptive
volitionalist as well. But nothing in these references justifies this
interpretation. In fact, there is much in the Postscript which would support an
opposite conclusion, i.e that Kierkegaard rejects the whole notion of one
individual prescribing values to another individual. Though Kierkegaard often
describes the subjectively existing thinker as ethical, (which, presumably, we
all "ought" to be,) and he speaks of faith as the highest virtue, he adamantly
avoids directly prescribing anything to the individual reader. A major tenet
held by Kierkegaard is that an individual must find his or her own way.
Kiekegaard admires Gotthold Ephraim Lessing for understanding this: "[Lessing]
understood and knew how to maintain, that the religious pertained to Lessing and
Lessing alone, just as it pertains to any human being in the same way..."
(Postscript, 65). Prescribing a way of life to another would be to
make an ethical judgment
regarding how that individual ought to be living. But this is precisely what
Kierkegaard says we cannot do. "One person cannot ethically judge another
because the one can understand the other only as a possibility."
(Postscript, 322).
There are additional references proposed by Pojman as implying a direct
volitionalist position in Kierkegaard. Pojman remarks that according to
Kierkegaard, the self believes by virtue of the absurd. He quotes from the
Postscript. "Faith is the objective uncertainty due to the
repulsion of the
absurd held fast by the passion of inwardness..."(Postscript, 611).
Pojman continues with an
elaboration on this quote: "The will is not able to believe what is fundamentally
absurd. Grace enables us to subvert principles of the understanding"
(Pojman, 73).
This argument is not different in kind from the inferences based on the previous
references. It is the case, according to Kierkegaard, that Christianity is
absurd, and involves a paradox. But the ineffability of Christianity is not
grounds to conclude that faith can only be attained as a result of a direct act
of the will.
Pojman's argument does not suffice to imply that Kierkegaard thought we can, or
should, will faith. The most that his references support is the contention that
it is possible to believe something that is contrary to reason. Grant, for the
sake of argument, that we can believe something that we simultaneously
acknowledge appears to be logically inconsistent. There can be explanations for
a belief in something that is apparently absurd. We cannot infer that the only
explanation for such a belief is that one has simply forced oneself to believe
it.
Pojman also cites the 'Interlude' of the Philosophical
Fragments.
Pojman points
out that Kierkegaard is discussing a type of belief that is
"the organ for
apprehending history," i.e. a type of ordinary belief, as
opposed to faith.
Though Pojman is primarily concerned with religious
belief, he finds in
Kierkegaard's writing, remarks concerning both types
of belief. Pojman
interprets the 'Interlude' as indicating that
Kierkegaard regards ordinary
beliefs as directly willed. He says that
according to Kierkegaard: "In
believing what happened in the past, the
will is active in recreating the scene
or proposition. It takes
testimony and reworks it, transforming the 'what' of
the past into an
active 'how' of the present, making the history contemporary".
(Pojman, 73). A close reading of the 'Interlude' gives no indication that
this is the
kind
of thing Kierkegaard is saying. Rather, he is occupied with the
concept of
necessity, and how the concept of necessity cannot apply to
anything that has
"come into existence" ((Philosophical
Fragments
Pojman places great
emphasis on a few lines from the 'Interlude': "Belief is not
so much a
conclusion, as a resolution...Belief is not a form of knowledge, but
a
free act, an expression of the will"Philosophical Fragments, 83).
Pojman concludes: "The idea is that the imagination (of which nothing human is
more free) takes over in belief attainment." He continues, "This is as radical
a volitionalism as Descartes's. We are free to believe whatever we
please" (Pojman, 73).
3. Evans Replies to Pojman
It is this argument of Pojman's, based on the Fragments, that Stephen Evans
responds to in his paper "Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed?"
Evans remarks: "The grounds for this reading [of Kierkegaard as a direct
volitionalist] are probably most strong in the Interlude" (Evans, 175).
Evans accepts Pojman's arguments against the validity of the
direct
volitionalist's position. But Evans challenges Pojman's reading
of Kierkegaard
as a direct volitionalist.
Allowing that Kierkegaard's views on ordinary belief have
implications for his
views concerning faith (faith is a type of belief,)
Evans proceeds to
consideration of Pojman's argument based on these
passages from the 'Interlude'. Evans explains that in this
discussion, Kierkegaard is responding to religious
Hegelians, who claim
that historical truths can be understood as necessary
truths;
Christianity thus could rest on a solid foundation (Evans, 175).
Evans points out
that Kiekegaard is holding the position that historical assertions are
contingent, that the historical realm cannot involve necessity.
Historical
truths are therefore susceptible to the arguments of the
skeptics, and cannot
ground Christianity. For assistance on this point,
Kierkegaard recalls that the
classical skeptics:
...doubted, not by virtue of knowledge, but by virtue of the
will... [the
skeptics held that] doubt can be terminated only in freedom, by an act of
the will (Philosophical Fragments,82).
We can acknowledge, with the skeptics as well as Kierkegaard, that what is not
known with certainty can be doubted. We are free to doubt what is contingent.
Nothing coerces the conclusion; the rules of logic do not necessitate our
acceptance of a contingent fact.
It is only if a few lines from the 'Interlude', such as those quoted above, are
taken out of context that it appears that Kierkegaard is arguing (in the words
of Pojman) that we are free to believe whatever we please.
But like Pojman, Evans (though he presented a lucid summary of the theme of the
'Interlude') seems to read these passages without adequate attention to context.
He analyses--without regard to overall message of the Interlude--the description
of the skeptics' reasoning that was quoted by Pojman, in order to strengthen his
claim that Kierkegaard's remarks concerning the skeptics do not imply direct
volitionalism. Evans recalls a significant line that Pojman quotes, and
emphasizes Kierkegaard's concluding phrase: "... doubt can be terminated only
in freedom, ... something every Greek skeptic would understand, inasmuch as he
understood himself"(Philosophical Fragments,82). Evans regards this
remark about self-awareness as evidence
that Kierkegaard is not a direct volitionalist. Evans points out that that
direct volitionalism assumes self-awareness. If an individual doesn't fully
understand what he is willing, he can't be said to be capable of directly
controlling his beliefs.
Evans says:
In tracing belief to will, Climacus by no means necessarily implies
that
beliefs are consciously chosen. If anything is evident about Kierkegaard
as a psychologist, it is that he is a depth psychologist. While
Kierkegaard certainly assigns will a central place in the human
personality, he thinks that human beings hardly ever make choices with
full consciousness of what they are doing.
(Evans, 178).
Evans is saying that the reason this relationship to the will doesn't entail
direct volitionalism, is because the skeptic may not be completely cognizant of
the fact that he is doubting as a result of his willing the doubting.
It may be that human beings and skeptics do not fully understand all their own
actions. But this point of Evans's does not effectively undermine Pojman's view
that Kierkegaard is a direct volitionalist. It may still be that in some cases,
cases when we fully understand what we are doing, we are aware that beliefs and
doubts are acts of the will. If direct volitionalism presupposes self-awareness,
then the willed belief can still occur, but only when the individual has
understood him or herself. Therefore, Evans's argument does not completely
discredit the thesis that Kierkegaard is a direct volitionalist; it does,
however, undermine the strength of Pojman's argument, as based on the
'Interlude.'
Evans is not opposed to the idea of Kierkegaard as an indirect volitionalist.
He points out that the passages from the 'Interlude', though not an indication
of direct volitionalism, do indicate indirect volitionalism. Indirect
volitionalism, Evans points out, (and Pojman agrees,) is not an objectionable
thesis.
Evans explains the passages quoted from the 'Interlude': "Kierkegaard may have
in mind the well-known fact that beliefs can be modified indirectly, in the
course of doing other things" (Evans, 178-179). Evans points out that
Kierkegaard emphasizes that
the skeptics are exercising their power of will. The skeptic wills to refrain
from drawing conclusions. Evans quotes Kiekegaard.
Insofar as he (the skeptic) uses dialectics in continually making
the
opposite equally probable, he does not erect his skepticism on dialectical
arguments, which are nothing more than outer fortifications, human
accommodations...By the power of the will he decides to restrain himself
and hold himself back from any conclusion.
(Philosophical Fragments, 84-85).
As Evans claims, there is indirect volitionalism occurring within the skeptical
reasoning described by Kierkegaard. The skeptics utilized indirect volitionalism
to achieve a state of suspenced judgement, by considering the opposite equally
probable. But any reading of an issue of volitionalism, of any type, into these
passages, is missing Kierkegaard's point. Kierkegaard is not discussing control
of mental states. He is discussing the concept of necessity and our freedom to
deny contingent facts.
It might be said that the skeptic wills to doubt the reality of a state-of-
affairs, or that he wills not to doubt, i.e. he wills to believe that a state-of-
affairs is the case. But these expressions are not precise formulations of what
is actually occurring. The skeptic does not literally decide not to believe in
something. Strictly speaking, he decides that a specific conclusion does not
follow from evidence that is given. The skeptic doesn't have the power to
believe or disbelieve whatever suits him (whether he fully understands himself
or not.) But he does have control over his inferential reasoning. He can regard
as insufficient, evidence that is generally accepted. This does not amount to
possession of control over belief states. Rather, this control shows possession
of an ability to exercise discretion concerning the validity of certain types of
inferencing and the strength of evidence.
The skeptics were concerned with the process of reasoning. They did not want to
risk false conclusions. Kierkegaard explains their project: "I am deceived only
when I conclude something about that stick [that looks broken in the
water]...this is why the skeptic keeps himself in suspenso, and this
state was
what he willed...([the skeptics say that the end in view is a mind suspended,
which brings with it a tranquility like its shadow.])" (Philosophical
Fragments, 83).
If they are willing a state of mind at all, that state of mind is in suspenso.
The skeptics are not willing doubt, any more than the gullible are willing
belief.
The contention that passages in the 'Interlude' imply that Kierkegaard thought
we can will beliefs probably results from a blurring of the willing of belief
with the acceptance of a conclusion. The appearance of such an implication is
a consequence of an ambiguity in Kierkegaard's language. If I decide to withhold
judgement until I'm better informed, I'm not consciously willing a state of
doubt. If I accept evidence, I'm not willing a belief. The belief is a
consequence of my act of accepting evidence. It can be said that I am free to
accept or reject evidence, except in certain cases, for example, cases of logical
entailment, or perhaps in cases of self-evidence. But in the case of matters-of-
fact, doubt is by virtue of the will, i.e. no type of necessity coerces assent.
4. Consider a broader reading of the Postscript
Direct volitionalism, the view that we can decide what to believe, is a doctrine
that would to be most appropriately held by a metaphysical idealist, a
solipsist, or perhaps a New Age convert--thinkers that deny, in some sense, the
hard reality of the objective world. Pojman views willed belief and faith as
problematic because he sees it as forcing ourselves to believe something, even
though objective evidence would guide us in the opposite direction. If
Christianity is without objective evidence, faith must just be created, in a way
analogous to a solipsist's concepts which are unconstrained by the realities of
the external world. Pojman reasons, if we are to believe it, we must somehow
just force ourselves to believe it.
Ironically, a very similar description of the leap, but intended as a caricature,
can be found in Kierkegaard's discussion of Lessing. Kierkegaard relates how
Lessing sees an attempted leap: "One closes one's eyes, grabs oneself by the
neck, a la Munchhausen, and then--then one stands on the other side, on that
other side of sound common sense in the promised land of the system"
(Postscript, 99).
In this reference to a leap, the metaphor does not depict how we might come to
accept the paradox. On the contrary, it is an exaggerated description of what
systematicians mistakenly believe is possible, viz. that contingent historical
truths could demonstrate eternal truths. Climacus maintains that a quantitative
transition does not lead to a qualitative conclusion, i.e. decisions about
matters pertaining to the eternal cannot be based on matters of fact, as if the
inference were from one thing to another of the same kind.
In the words of Lessing, quoted by Climacus, "That [transition,] that is the ugly
broad ditch that I cannot cross, however often and however earnestly I have tried
to make the leap"(Postscript, 98). Climacus enjoys Lessing's
humour, when Lessing talks of
earnestly wanting to make the leap. It is humourous, precisely because this leap
can't happen simply by wanting it (no matter how earnestly.) Climacus then,
would similarly respond to Pojman; this leap doesn't happen simply by wanting it
(or willing it.) If a leap is possible, it is not like a decision made within
the realm of historical matters-of-fact; it cannot happen by lifting oneself up
by the neck. To become a Christian, and somehow cross this divide, an absolute
decision is involved, a qualitative leap.
This point about historical truths being inadequate to ground Christianity is of
major importance in the Postscript. Climacus regards the
Hegelians as self-
deceivers when they believe that they can ground Christianity in a system of
existence. Climacus maintains that a system of existence cannot be given: "In
order to think existence, systematic thought must think it as annulled and
consequently not as existing" (Postscript, 118). This is because a
system is by definition
complete and all-inclusive. The systematic thinker, himself existing, cannot be
part of his concluded system. Climacus says: "Who is supposed to write, or
finish such a system?" (Postscript, 120). It is only a transcendent
god that can have this bird's
eye view. But the Hegelians want to be able to include Christianity within the
system.
In articulating the sense in which the truth of Christianity is unknowable,
Climacus makes use of the concept 'paradox.' Christianity involves the absolute
paradox of the godhead existing in time; it is the thesis that God has existed
in human form. Climacus says "The only possible
understanding of
the absolute
paradox is that it cannot be understood"
(Postscript, 217-218).
Pojman might ask, if Climacus is not claiming that we can will faith, how then
is he suggesting that we arrive at faith (given the lack of rational evidence to
support faith?) I would respond, it is not clear that Climacus intends to guide
us to faith at all. He discusses at length the importance of individuality and
subjective thinking. He speaks of the transformation to inwardness and a
reorientation away from objectivity. Rather than suggesting that we develop
faith, Climacus describes a growing subjectivity through which the absolute
paradox can be realized.
Though Climacus does not show an interest in volitionalism, he does put much
effort into a discussion of willing the absolute telos (willing in the highest
sense). Recall the discussions of the Pathos section (Postscript,
387-431). Climacus speaks of the
individual whose existence is transformed because he has renounced everything but
the highest good, which is willed for its own sake.
Absolute willing does not preclude relative willing, but the absolute relation
can require renunciation of all relative end.Postscript, 405).
The subjectively existing
individual experiences continual temptation to relate absolutely to the world-
historical, and must continually renew resolve. The subjective individual,
relating to the absolute, acts, but not for fame, money, love, etc., not even for
the good of humanity. These are relative ends, and are not willed absolutely.
Only one thing is willed absolutely, viz. the absolute.
In these pages, Climacus is not only not supposing that we can or should will
faith, but, on the contrary, is emphasizing that the transformed person
absolutely wills only the absolute, to the exclusion of all else. Clearly this
kind of absolute relationship precludes actions that control or transform one's
own belief state, for the purpose of becoming a Christian.
This sort of attempt to control one's own belief state for the purpose of
producing faith is analogous to the situation of the monks of the Middle Ages to
which Climacus refers. In the monasteries much effort was put into creating a
life and a frame of mind which, to all appearances, was close to God. Climacus
declares: "True inwardness does not demand any sign at all in
externals" (Postscript, 414). The
absolute relation to the highest good does not follow from external actions.
Cultivation of the outward appearance of Godliness can become the end in itself,
resulting in the loss of the absoluteness of the relation to the absolute telos.
Climacus remarks "renunciation of everything is nothing, if it is supposed to
merit the highest good."Postscript, 408).
A criterion of the absolute relationship to the absolute is the absence of any
ulterior purpose, or any expectation of consequence or reward. "The specific
sign that one relates oneself to the absolute is there is no reward
expected."Postscript, 402).
Willing to believe, directly or indirectly, is a relative willing, and hence a
movement away from inwardness and the absolute relationship. To will a belief
state, in order to achieve faith or eternal happiness, is willing something for
consequences. Self-manipulation can only serve to separate the individual from
the absolute. The absolute relationhship is not something gained by
willing to
achieve it. The act of willing anything other than the absolute undermines the
absolute relationship.
The willing of the absolute good is the absolute decision, the qualitative leap.
The will is involved in the process of becoming a Christian. But one doesn't
attempt to will the absolute in order to become a Christian, for then the
absolute isn't being willed for its own sake. However, Pojman's position might
be rephrased so as to allow a related objection to develop. Rather than arguing
that there is no objective evidence to support belief, one might argue that there
is nothing that would occasion willing the absolute. Since there can be no
objective evidence to convince an individual to will the absolute, willing the
absolute telos can only be something you must just force yourself to do.
However, as in the case of the objectively unsubstantiated belief, there can be
explanations for the absolute decision.
Evans suggests: "The believer might be convinced that the paradoxical nature of
the god-man is a reality by a first-person encounter with the god-man. The
belief is the result of the encounter with reality, not of some arbitrary act of
the will" (Evans, 183). This encounter could not be considered
rational objective evidence,
but it could result in a transformation of an individual's existence. Climacus
hints at the occurrence of such encounters with phrases like 'the moment the
eternal touches,' and 'co-knowledge,' and various other expressions which connote
an experience of unity.
Investigation into possible explanations for the absolute decision--explanations
that are alternatives to rational and objective evidence, and the notion that it
is arbitrary--is a project that is suggested by the conclusion of this paper.
In his book Transforming Vision9, M.
Jamie Ferreira emphasizes the role that the
imagination plays in the writings of Kiekegaard. The solution to the question
of the explanation of the absolute decision may lie along these lines. A
believer leaps, not as a rational being, but by virtue of the power of
imagination.
Notes
